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 Abstract The Nigerian constitution makes provision for the impeachment of public officers- the President, Vice 
President, Governor and Deputy Governor. Any such impeachment conducted not in accordance with the 
constitutional provision is declared illegal by the courts and the public officer concerned reinstated as a 
remedy. In the case under review, a state Governor was illegally impeached but reinstated after eleven months 
as a result of which he sought for a remedy to enable him complete the four-year tenure as provided by the 
constitution which was refused by the court. The paper having examined the decision found that it is not 
predicated on a sound legal pedestal as it is fraught with wrong interpretation of the relevant constitutional 
provision and injustice. Consequently, the remedy granted to the Governor is grossly inadequate in the 
circumstance. We recommend that the courts should be active in interpreting the tenure of illegally impeached 
public officers as not to include the time they spent out of office. This is in line with the letters and spirit of the 
constitution and to advance adequate remedy in the circumstance. 
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     Introduction 
 
Democracy has gained ground in most 
nations of the world including Nigeria 
(Mamman & Okorie, 2012), as military 
regime is considered outdated (Shehu, 
2011). One of the most important 
elements of democracy is that it enshrines 
presidential system of government 
(Shehu, 2011) based on the principle of 
separation of powers (Nwagwu, 2014) 
among its organs (Odinma & Odinma, 
2015). The legislature is a basic structure 
of a political government (Tom & Atai, 
2014) in that it occupies a strategic 
position in democratic governance 
(Ewuim et. al., 2014) and serves as a vital 
check on the power of the executive 
(Lock, 1993). Therefore, Nigerian 
constitution enables the legislature to act 
as the watchdog of the executive by 
vesting on it the power of impeachment of 
President, Vice president, Governor, or 
Deputy Governor (Tom & Atai, 2014). 
 
Impeachment is the act (by 
legislature) of calling for removal of a 
public official, accomplished by presenting 
a written charge of the official’s alleged 
misconduct (Bryan, 2009). It is the 
process whereby political executives are 
tried for misconduct by the 
representatives of the people resulting in 
their removal from office (Adekunle, 
2007). Based on this, impeachment is a 
means to removal of the public officer. 
However, under the Nigerian constitution, 
impeachment and removal are mostly 
used interchangeably and it is used as 
such in this paper. The grounds and the 
procedure for the conduct of 
impeachment proceedings has been 
provided by the constitution (Sections 
143 & 188 of the Constitution).  
 
However, the legality of such 
impeachments has always been challenged 
in courts on ground of noncompliance with 
the constitutional requirements. 
Consequent upon this, most of them have 
been nullified and the Governor or Deputy 
Governor reinstated as part of judicial 
remedies. The impeachment of Governors 
Rashid Ladoja of Oyo State is one of such 
cases. The basis for the case under review 
is further judicial remedy sequel to the 
reinstatement of Rashid Ladoja as 
Governor of Oyo State. It is against this 
background that this paper seeks to 
examine the adequacy or otherwise of the 
judicial remedies awarded to the Governor 
following his reinstatement. 
 
Judicial Review of Impeachment 
 
Judicial review is the power of a competent 
court of law to determine the 
constitutionality of an executive or 
legislative act (Nwabueze, 1982). It is an 
effective means through which the exercise 
of executive and legislative powers could be 
controlled (Samuel, 2000), checked and 
restrained (Udofia, 2015) without which 
civil dictatorship may ensue (Enyinna, 
2013). It is also the pronouncements of acts 
of a public authority that is superfluous of 
the powers conferred by the enabling law 
(Oluyide A. and Aihe, 2003). It is the 
exercise of judicial powers to curtail the 
actions or inactions of the other organs of 
government (Mbwana, 2002), hence serves 
as the tool for checks and balances in the 
hands of the court to achieve political 
accountability and promote good public 
administration (Woolf, 2007).  This power 
of judicial review is vested by the Nigerian 
constitution on the courts (Section 6 of the 
Constitution) even though its application 
may vary in some jurisdictions (Helgadottir, 
2015; Hirsch, 2015; Swati, 2015; Sanjay, 
2014).  
 
Judicial review of impeachment had 
suffered in the past due largely to the ouster 
clause contained in the impeachment 
provisions. However, since the decision of 
the Supreme Court in Anakoju vs. Adeleke & 
Ors, the Nigerian courts got the legal 
pedestal to entertain questions and issues 
on impeachment under the Nigerian 
constitution. Therefore, where the 
constitutional provisions for impeachment 
have not been complied with, the aggrieved 
could approach the court for judicial review. 
 
Judicial Remedies for Illegal Impeachment 
 
Judicial remedies is any of the reliefs sought 
for or granted to an aggrieved party after a 
successful judicial review of the case. Where 
the conclusion of the court is that the 
impeachment was legally conducted, then the 
public officer concerned will have no any 
judicial remedy. However, where the 
judgment of the court is that the 
impeachment of the public officer is illegal, 
then the issue of the appropriate remedy to 
be granted arises. Put briefly, the remedies 
mostly granted for illegal impeachment 
include declaration that the impeachment is 
illegal, unconstitutional (Malemi, 2012; 
Inakoju vs. Adeleke); an injunction 
restraining further impeachment on the 
same grounds (Atiku Abubakar vs. Attorney 
General of the Federation & Ors); and 
mandamus compelling the reinstatement of 
the public officer concerned (Aguda, 1980).  
 
The Case of Ladoja vs. INEC & Ors  
 
 Summary of Facts and Decision 
 
The appellant in this case, Senator Rashid 
Ladoja, won the general elections as 
conducted by the Independent National 
Electoral Commission on 19th April, 2003 
and took the oath of office and that of 
allegiance on 29th May 2003. Just like any 
Governor, he was elected for a term of four 
years starting from the time he took the said 
oaths. However, he was impeached in 2005 
as a result of which his deputy took over as 
Governor. He challenged his impeachment 
from the High Court through to the Court of 
Appeal up to the Supreme Court which 
declared the impeachment illegal, null and 
void and accordingly ordered for his 
reinstatement after about eleven months 
(Inakoju vs. Adeleke). Following this 
judgment, the appellant approached a 
Federal High Court to determine whether in 
the light of section 180 of the constitution, 
which bestows on him a four-year term, and 
the decision of the Supreme Court which 
declared his impeachment illegal, the eleven 
months he spent out of office as a result of 
the impeachment forms part of his four-year 
term. He sought for the declaration that he 
was entitled to uninterrupted four-year term 
and that the period of eleven months during 
which he was kept out of office does not 
form part of his tenure, among other judicial 
remedies. In other words, he was seeking for 
the determination of his four year tenure. 
The court, in a unanimous judgment, held 
that the appellant has not shown any thing 
on record by which the fixed period of four 
years under section 180 (2) of the 
Constitution could be extended. The 
constitution does not give the court power to 
grant extension of tenure to the Governor 
who was improperly impeached. “To hold 
otherwise would amount to reading into the 
Constitution provisions that are not there”, 
the court added. In other words, the court 
was of the view that the tenure of the 
Governor is four years as provided by the 
constitution which commences from the time 
he takes the oaths irrespective of the illegal 
impeachment.   
 
 A Critique of the Decision 
 
 The decision of the Supreme Court in the 
case under review is wrong, this paper 
argued. The argument is predicated upon the 
following reasons.  
 
 Wrong Interpretation and Application of 
the Relevant Constitutional Provision  
 
Interpretation of the constitutional provision 
on the tenure of an illegally impeached 
Governor is the crux of the decision in the 
case under review. It should be noted that 
there are various rules of interpretation of 
statutes including the constitution under the 
Nigerian legal system. They are largely 
evolved and developed by the common law 
judges. The Nigerian courts mostly adopt and 
apply them in appropriate circumstances 
when performing their duty of interpretation 
(Action Congress vs. INEC). The traditional 
rules of interpretation are the literal, golden 
and mischief rule. The literal rule postulates 
that words must be interpreted according to 
their literal, ordinary and grammatical 
meaning (Dapianlong vs. Dariye; Ibe, 2010). 
However, where the words are ambiguous, or 
are reasonably susceptible of more than one 
meaning or the relevant provision is 
irreconcilable with any other provision of the 
enactment; then the court may depart from 
this literal rule (Action Congress & Anor vs. 
INEC). The golden rule is that where the 
literal interpretation would lead to absurdity 
or apparent injustice which the lawmakers 
wouldn’t have intended, the courts must 
reject that interpretation (Beck vs. Smith; 
Ugwu vs. Ararume). According to the mischief 
rule, in the interpretation of statute, the 
court should consider the common law as it 
stood before it was passed, the mischief and 
the shortcoming that gave rise to the 
legislation and the remedy it provided 
(Heydon’s case;  I.B.W.A Ltd vs. Imano;  
Kolawole vs. Alberto; Nwokocha  vs. Governor 
of Anambra State & Ors). 
 
However, there emerged a new rule of 
interpretation known as the purposive rule. 
This is earlier advocated by prominent Lord 
Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd vs. 
Asher) and  the House of Lord finally 
approved it in (Pepper Inspector of Taxes vs. 
Hart) when it declared that “…the Courts 
must adopt a purposive approach which 
seeks to give effect to the true purpose of the 
legislation”. The Nigerian Supreme Court had 
also approved and adopted this approach in 
the celebrated case of Nafiu Rabiu vs. The 
State. Furthermore, the Court had variously 
employed a creative mode of interpretation 
in order to expound the law in appropriate 
cases. 
 
This notwithstanding, the court in the case 
under review adopted a rather conservative 
rule of interpretation when confronted with 
the determination of the tenure of a 
Governor who was illegally impeached. The 
interpretation given in this case is against all 
the known rules of interpretation as 
highlighted above. The interpretation of the 
court is that the tenure of a Governor is four 
years which starts from the date he took the 
oath of office and allegiance irrespective of 
what happens along the line. The 
constitution, according to the court, does not 
provide for uninterrupted four years as the 
tenure. In other words, once a Governor 
takes the oath, his tenure starts to count and 
will end four years thereafter irrespective of 
what kept him out of the office like 
impeachment in this case. The implication is 
that if a Governor is kept out of office for a 
period of two and a half years as a result of 
illegal impeachment before he is reinstated 
by the court, he is entitled to enjoy a tenure 
of one and a half years only. This is against 
the letters and spirit of the constitutional 
provisions on the tenure of Governor.  
 
The literal rule of interpretation seemingly 
applied by the court in this case is very 
wrong as it leads to absurdity and work great 
injustice on the appellant Governor. 
Furthermore, it is against the letters and 
spirit of the constitutional provisions on the 
tenure of Governor. The literal rule, after all, 
is now completely out of date and has been 
replaced by the purposive approach (Tobias, 
2003). The trend now in most jurisdictions is 
to adopt an interpretation with the aim to 
“promote the general legislative purpose” 
(Nothman vs. Barnet Council; PDP vs. INEC). 
Although the Nigerian Supreme Court had 
variously applied the rules as pointed out 
above, the present judicial approach is that 
words of an enactment are to be read in their 
entire grammatical and ordinary context and 
harmoniously with the structure of the Act 
and the purpose of the legislature (Sokefun, 
2016). This entails a combination of all the 
rules because they are considered as 
complimentary to one another (Attorney-
General of Bendel State vs. Attorney General of 
the Federation). In addition, constitution 
should be more generously construed than 
an ordinary legislative enactment (Sokefun, 
2016). 
 
Thus, the intendment of the legislature in this 
regard is that a Governor should serve for 
four years from the date he took the oath of 
office, unless where it is cut short by any of 
the causes recognized by the constitution. 
The provision only mentioned the particular 
date when the tenure starts, but not the 
specific date it ends. It’s a misconception of 
the provision for the court in the case under 
review to have concluded that the appellant’s 
tenure in this case ended exactly four years 
after taking the oaths despite that he was 
kept out of the office for a period of eleven 
months. This is based on the simple logic that 
by that time he would have spent barely 
three years which is clearly short of the 
tenure provided by the constitution. 
 
The court ran into this error because it 
considered any interpretation which allows 
the Governor eleven months period as 
extension or elongation of his tenure. This is 
one of the reasons for rejecting the 
appellant’s reliefs. Extension or elongation of 
tenure beyond the four years provided by the 
constitution is where the Governor served a 
day or more after the four years (Brig. Gen. 
Mohammed Buba Marwa & Ors.vs Admiral 
Murtala Nyako & Ors). All the appellant was 
asking was that he be allowed to complete or 
exhaust the four years given to him by the 
constitution. And given the trend of liberal 
and purposive approach in the 
interpretation of the constitution being 
towed by the Supreme Court (PDP vs. INEC; 
Ojunkwu vs. Obasanjo & Ors)  and other 
courts in recent times (Njoku vs. Jonathan), 
the court ought to have given effect to the 
constitution which recognizes four years for 
the Governor. The intention of the framers of 
the constitution is that such Governor who is 
not caught by death, resignation, permanent 
incapacity or impeachment (legal 
impeachment) should enjoy a tenure of four 
years. His illegal impeachment ought not to 
have served as a barrier to deny him the four 
years as the constitution intends. 
 
It should be noted that even according to 
Section 15 Interpretation Act (Akeredolu & 
Ors. vs. Akinremi ) , in computation of time 
for doing an act where the last day for doing 
an act falls within a public holiday, the 
deadline is shifted to the following day after 
the holiday. This is because the law 
recognizes the impossibility of doing the act 
on the particular day it is required to be 
performed. So also in the case of 
interpretation of the tenure of an impeached 
Governor like in the case under review, since 
there is the impossibility of performing the 
duties of his office as a result of the 
impeachment which has now been voided, 
then the computation of his tenure should 
not include the period he was kept out of the 
office.   
 
From the foregoing, the interpretation  of 
section 180 (2) of the constitution as 
adopted and applied by the Supreme Court 
to the facts in this case that the tenure of an 
improperly impeached Governor is three 
years and one month and not four years is, 
with due respect, wrong. This is because it is 
against the letters and spirit of the section 
and the purpose of the legislature.  
 
The supreme court found itself in this tricky 
situation as a result of its boldness in the 
interpretation of the ouster clause in the 
impeachment provision that it could now 
intervene into impeachment to determine its 
compliance with the constitution. By so 
doing, the court would determine the legality 
or otherwise of impeachment. Where it is 
found to be illegal, the court has to reinstate 
the public officer concerned. After the 
reinstatement, the question of the 
determination of his tenure would naturally 
arise. This being the case, the court should as 
well summon the courage to interpret the 
constitution according to its letters and 
spirit.  
 
Lack of Substantial Justice to the 
Appellant 
 
The aim of administration of justice is to 
serve the end of justice to all concerned - the 
parties and the society. So, the courts have 
the duty to provide remedy once it is 
established that a wrong is done to a litigant. 
This is a recognized legal principle as vividly 
reiterated by the Supreme Court in the 
following words:  “The law is an equal 
dispenser of justice, and leaves none without 
a remedy for his right. It is thus a basic and 
elementary principle of common law that 
whenever there is a wrong, legal wrong or 
injuria, there ought to be a remedy to redress 
that wrong” (Aliyu Bello vs. A-G Oyo State).  
The inspiration provided in the Lord 
Denning’s famous judicial pronouncement in 
Packer vs. Packer enables courts to do 
substantial justice in deserving cases even if 
it is for the first time. He was of the view that 
where the courts shy away from doing 
something because it was not done before, 
the law will be left behind which will not be 
good for it and the society. 
 
The Nigerian Supreme Court is sometimes 
inspired by this philosophy in its quest to 
ensure that substantial justice is done in a 
case. A justice of the Supreme Court, Kayode 
Eso, expressed the view that the concern for 
justice must be the overriding force and basis 
for the actions of the court in its 
interpretative jurisdiction and approach in 
the examination of the cases before it 
(Engineering Enterprise Contractor of Nigeria 
vs. Attorney General of Kaduna State). The 
need for justice and fairness in deserving 
cases and to cater for societal changes is 
another principle behind the development of 
new laws (Tajuddeen, 2013). Whenever a 
new situation arises which has not been 
considered before, the judges have to say 
what the law is. In so doing, they do not 
change the law (Gouriet vs. Union of Post 
Office Workers).  
 
In the light of the above, since it had been 
recognized in the case under review that the 
Governor was not impeached in accordance 
with the provision of the constitution, justice 
demands that he should not be subjected to 
any disadvantage arising out of the 
impeachment. To do otherwise is to reward 
the “criminal” and punish the innocent. 
Therefore, the period of eleven months he 
was kept out of office due to the illegal 
impeachment should not form part of the 
four-year tenure given to him by the 
constitution. This is indeed a novel situation 
in that it was the first to arise in Nigeria’s 
constitutional jurisprudence. Since the law 
makers have decided to brazenly disregard 
the constitutional provision on the 
impeachment, they should not be allowed to 
benefit from their act. To declare that the 
impeachment was illegal but deny him the 
four-year tenure provided by the 
constitution is to create a situation where 
the loser takes all while the winner goes 
home with little.  
 
To avoid such a situation, the Supreme Court 
did the needful in the interest of justice in 
deserving circumstances. Thus, in Amaechi 
vs. INEC & Ors the court declared a person 
who did not participate in a general election 
as the winner of the election seemingly 
against established legal principles that a 
person who did not contest for an election 
could not be declared winner. This the court 
did in its interpretation of the relevant 
statutory provisions to meet substantial 
justice to remedy the wrong in the case. The 
court said that it will “…do justice even if the 
heavens fall. The truth of course is that when 
justice has been done, the heavens stay in 
place…” The court went further to grant a 
judicial remedy not even requested because 
it was then the only remedy available to 
redress the wrong done to Amaechi (Sagay, 
2016). This supports the position that, in its 
interpretative jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court in deserving cases prefer the 
interpretation that best serves justice in the 
case (Sokefun, 2016).  
 
This was also exhibited in the case of 
Awolowo vs. Shagari where the court was 
faced with the onerous task of interpretation 
of what amounted to two-third of 19 states to 
declare a candidate as winner of an election. 
The court, by the majority of six to one, opted 
for the interpretation that did, in its opinion, 
a substantial justice. It held that 12 states and 
two-third votes of another state, not 13 
states, should be considered as two-third of 
19 states. This is because to regard 13 as 
two-third of 19 states would have occasioned 
great injustice by imposing more than what 
the law required. Another instance is the case 
of PDP vs. INEC where the Supreme Court 
liberally interpreted the word “dies” to 
include the situation where an elected 
Governor abandoned the position before 
taking the oath of office. This is despite the 
fact that the situation is not clearly 
contemplated by the provision.  
 
Conclusion 
 The constitution provides for a four-year 
tenure for President, Vice President, 
Governor and Deputy Governor which 
commences from the time they take the oath 
of office and allegiance. This is the purpose of 
the provision as unambiguously stated in the 
relevant section. The tenure could not 
ordinarily be extended beyond four unless 
where the country is at war and elections 
could not be conducted. However, the tenure 
could be shorter than four years as a result of 
resignation, death, permanent incapacity or 
impeachment. Where resignation or 
impeachment is declared to be contrary to 
the provisions of the constitution, it is 
declared illegal and the public officer 
concerned reinstated. The reinstatement 
should be followed by another judicial 
remedy to allow him exhaust or complete the 
four-year tenure he is entitled to. This is 
simply giving effect to the intendment of the 
legislature and not any tenure elongation or 
extension as the Supreme Court, with due 
respect, erroneously believed in the case 
under review. Therefore, it is found that the 
case of Ladoja vs. INEC & Ors epitomizes 
wrong interpretation and application of 
constitutional provision on the tenure of 
illegally impeached Governor. The remedy 
granted to him following his illegal 
impeachment is grossly inadequate and at 
variance with the intention of the legislature 
as expressed in the letters and spirit of the 
constitution. The courts should therefore be 
active to interpret and apply the provisions 
of the constitution in the interest of 
substantial justice in deserving cases like the 
one under review. 
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